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I. INTRODUCTION
THE FACE of airport security was destined to change on themorning of September 11, 2001 (9/11). After nineteen
armed terrorists attacked four U.S. flights, crashing them into
the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Penn-
sylvania,' a nation that had spent decades combating aviation-
based terrorism was ready to fight back.
Over the years, as the nation fought for friendly skies, the
fight to maintain constitutionally guaranteed freedoms contin-
ued in the halls of Congress, in the agencies of the Executive
Branch, and in the courts. Historically, the judiciary has used
many different frameworks to balance the state's interest in
maintaining safe air travel with the individual's Fourth Amend-
ment rights. 2 Over time, however, each framework for consider-
ing airport security measures has fallen short of the mark.' The
administrative-search exception, although commonly used in
the courts today when considering TSA action and other airport
security measures, does not meet the needs of airport security in
post-2001 America.
This article examines the different frameworks and the
problems with each. In particular, it examines the currently
vogue administrative-search exception and its application in the
courts. In recent years-post-2001-courts have increasingly ig-
nored the actual test required for the administrative-search ex-
ception to apply, instead allowing the interest in "no more 9/
1is" to supplant the true balancing that the exception requires.
This article argues that because the administrative-search excep-
tion is ill-suited for modern airport security measures-particu-
larly those implemented by the TSA-courts should use a
different framework. This article further examines the suitability
of extending the national-security exception to the airport se-
curity context. While historically applied only in electronic sur-
veillance cases, the national-security exception may be a more
appropriate framework for courts to use in considering Fourth
Amendment airport security cases because it would enable
courts to avoid the difficult-if not impossible-task of squaring
1 Michael Howard Saul, America Grieves, Reflects, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2011,
8:41 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB00014240531119043535045765643
42677754296.html.
2 SeeJohn Rogers, Bombs, Borders, and Boarding: Combatting International Terror-
ism at United States Airports and the Fourth Amendment, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REv. 501, 518-32 (1997).
3 See infra Part II.C.
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modern TSA search procedures with case law developed under
pre-2001 airport security measures.
This article begins by examining the history of threats to avia-
tion security and the corresponding development of aviation se-
curity law in the courts. Part II provides an overview of each of
the frameworks used for considering Fourth Amendment con-
cerns, details the flaws with each, and narrows in on the admin-
istrative-search exception-the post-2001 framework that is most
often used for considering Fourth Amendment concerns involv-
ing the TSA, technology, or search procedures. Part III then
considers the national-security exception. It begins with a his-
tory of how the national-security exception developed and
where it has been applied. It then considers whether the excep-
tion could be applied to the airport security context and what
the scope of the exception would be. Part IV concludes with rec-
ommendations for courts going forward on how to best balance
the state's interest in promoting aviation security with the pri-
vacy and other rights of the individual.
II. HISTORY OF AIRPORT SECURITY
A. THREATS TO AvIATION SECURITY AND THE
GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE
Many consider the first skyjacking of an American aircraft to
have occurred in May 1961 when National Airlines Flight 337
was diverted from Miami to Cuba.' Politically motivated skyjack-
ings increased rapidly,5 peaking in 1969 with thirty-three suc-
cessful skyjackings.6 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
4 See Rogers, supra note 2, at 504 ("[T]his event marked the first such incident
involving an American aircraft."); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 897 & n.4
(1973). But cf Dolan Morgan, The First Hijacking Myth, FORTNIGHT J. 4 (Dec. 8,
2011), http://fortnightjournal.com/dolan-morgan/258-the-first-hijacking-myth.
html (explaining that the year 1911 was actually "the first time anyone ever com-
plained of the theft of a flying machine" (quoting Plane Stolen; Shem-iff in Air,
BALTMORE SUN, Aug. 9, 1911)).
5 This article does not go into great detail on the history of threats to aviation
security, particularly in the United States. Many other articles have provided fan-
tastic summaries of the relevant history. See generally Rogers, supra note 2, at
504-10 (giving a detailed history of aviation terrorism and the U.S. response
through the mid-1990s); Brittany R. Stancombe, Fed Up with Being Felt Up: The
Complicated Relationship Between the Fourth Amendment and TSA's "Body Scanners" and
"Pat-Downs", 42 CUMB. L. REv. 181, 183-92 (2012) (beginning in 2001 and
describing the advent of the TSA, as well as modern search and security mea-
sures, including advanced imaging technology (AIT)-"body scanners").
6 United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 804 (2d Cir. 1974).
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responded by mandating the screening of select passengers who
fit "skyjack profiles" and then eventually by screening all passen-
gers before allowing them to fly.7 Ultimately, a search regime
developed that "remained in place for decades, even after ...
September 11."I This regime included screening in which all
passengers, before boarding at the gate, were required "to pass
through a magnetometer and surrender their carry-on items or
their person for a more intrusive search in the event that the
magnetometer was alerted."9 Naturally, with each new search
procedure came new legal challenges. As discussed in more de-
tail below, courts use a variety of methods for evaluating airport
security measures. Courts have evaluated airport searches as
stop-and-frisk searches, border searches, consensual searches,
and administrative searches.
B. MODERN SCREENING METHODS
In 2001, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
was created as part of the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act." The federal government took control of screening all pas-
sengers and their bags at airports in November 2002.11 The TSA
was moved from the Department of Transportation to the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) on March 1, 2003.12 In
the years since 2001, TSA security measures have gradually tight-
ened, requiring everything from passenger shoe removal to a
ban on most liquids.13
7 Alexander A. Reinert, Revisiting "Special Needs" Theory via Airport Searches, 106
Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 207, 210 (2012).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101, 115
Stat. 597, 597 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 114(a)). This Act was signed into
law on November 19, 2001.
31 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG No.
04-37, AUDIT OF PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENING PROCEDURES AT DOMESTIC
AIRPORTS 1 (2004).
12 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 403, 1502, 116 Stat.
2135, 2178, 2308 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 203, 542) (allowing for the trans-
fer of certain agencies, including the TSA, to the Department of Homeland Se-
curity); Conyers v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 388 F.3d 1380, 1381 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(noting that the "TSA was transferred from the Department of Transportation to
the Department of Homeland Security, effective March 1, 2003").
13 See Need for Removal of Shoes at Checkpoint, TSA (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.tsa.
gov/press/news/2013/01/07/need-removal-shoes-checkpoint; 3-1-1 for Carry-




In 2007, the TSA began testing new technology-known as
advanced imaging technology (AIT)-to detect explosives and
other metal and nonmetal threats to aviation security.1 4 Two
types of technology have been developed and used in airports:
"millimeter wave and backscatter. Millimeter wave technology
bounces electromagnetic waves off the body to create a black
and white three-dimensional image. Backscatter technology
projects low level X-ray beams over the body to create a reflec-
tion of the body displayed on the monitor."" In 2010, the TSA
implemented AIT as the primary screening method for passen-
gers at airports nationwide.1 6 But "AIT screening is optional for
all passengers. Passengers who opt out of AIT screening will re-
ceive alternative screening, including a physical pat-down."' As
it implemented AIT as the primary screening method, the TSA
also introduced new pat-down procedures.'" A pat-down per-
formed following the post-2010 procedures is referred to as an
"enhanced pat-down.""
In February 2011, the TSA began testing Automated Target
Recognition (ATR) software, which works with millimeter wave
AIT.2 o ATR software uses the same millimeter wave screening
technology, but instead of requiring a TSA agent to analyze
images of actual passenger scans, the system itself "performs all
necessary image analysis to determine the location of anomalies
found during a scan of the passenger, thereby removing the
human factor from the image review process. The AIT with ATR
then displays information regarding the location of the anoma-
lies on an avatar to facilitate secondary screening."2 1 In 2012,
Congress passed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act,
which, among other things, requires the use of ATR technology
14 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG No. 12-06,
TSA PENETRATION TESTING OF ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 2011),
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIGSLR_1 2-06_Novl .pdf.
15 Id.
16 Colleen Deal, Comment, Faith or Flight?: A Religious Dilemma, 76 J. AIR L. &
COM. 525, 526-27 (2011).
17 TSA PENETRATION TESTING OF ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY, supra note
14.
18 TSA Statement on New Pat-down Procedures, TSA (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.
tsa.gov/press/releases/2010/10/28/tsa-statement-new-pat-down-procedures;
Deal, supra note 16, at 539.
19 See Deal, supra note 16, at 539-40.
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for all passenger screening beginning on June 1, 2012.22 In mid-
2013, the TSA began removing backscatter scanners from
airports.25
C. AIRPORT SECURITY IN THE COURTS
Beginning with the advent of airport security measures in the
1960s, individuals have been concerned with the risk to individ-
ual privacy rights posed by airport security searches.2 ' Because
of the nature of the searches, courts have struggled to reconcile
the interest in passenger safety with the constitutional protec-
tions afforded the passenger against unwarranted government
intrusion into personal privacy.25 These constitutional protec-
tions are based on the Fourth Amendment and its subsequent
jurisprudence.2
The Fourth Amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.27
As a threshold question in Fourth Amendment cases, courts
must consider whether a government action is a "search or
seizure."2" From the beginning, airport security searches have,
22 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 826, 126
Stat. 11, 132 (2012) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(1) (2)).
23 See Ron Nixon, Unpopular Full-Body Scanners to Be Removed from Airports, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/19/us/tsa-to-remove-
invasive-body-scanners.html? r=0; Joe Sharkey, A Farewell to 'Nudity' at Airport
Checkpoints, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/
business/a-farewell-to-nudity-at-airport-checkpoints.html.
24 See Reinert, supra note 7, at 208 (referring to the "slew of constitutional chal-
lenges to new security measures imposed by airlines and the [FAA]" in the
1960s).
25 See id. ("[I]t is difficult to find the right doctrinal fit for searches like these.
The searches affect large portions of the population, are based on no suspicion
whatsoever, and are public in nature. Under traditional Fourth Amendment
probable cause and warrant requirements, they would clearly not pass muster.").
26 See id.
27 U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
28 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) ("A 'search' occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is
infringed. A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interfer-
ence with an individual's possessory interests in that property." (footnotes
omitted)).
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without question, been considered searches under the Fourth
Amendment.2 9
If the government action is a search, then the general rule is
that a warrant is required.3 0 But "in the context of safety and
administrative regulations, a search unsupported by probable
cause may be reasonable 'when special needs, beyond the nor-
mal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirements impracticable.' 3 Therefore, in the context
of airport security-where every passenger is searched, regard-
less of individualized suspicion-the warrant and probable
cause requirements are impracticable. As a result, courts require
the government to defend its airport security regimes under one
of the specific, defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment."
Over the years, courts have used several different frameworks
for analyzing warrantless searches at airport security check-
points. 3 Specifically, courts have applied theories based on the
stop-and-frisk search, consent, the critical-zone approach, and
the administrative-search exception. 4 These theories represent
a progression; they are not all used by courts today.
Each of these theories, however, has its shortcomings.3 1 Partic-
ularly given the development in passenger screening technology
29 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 904 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled by United
States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) ("It is entirely clear ... that through-
out the period since late 1968 the government's participation in the development
and implementation of the airport search program has been of such significance
as to bring any search conducted pursuant to that program within the reach of
the Fourth Amendment."); see United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir.
1973) ("Although the problem of aerial hijacking is well known to the public, we
think it appropriate, nevertheless, to single out our reasons for treating airport
security searches as an exceptional and exigent situation under the Fourth
Amendment.").
30 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985) ("This fundamental right
[protected by the Fourth Amendment] is preserved by a requirement that
searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an independent judicial
officer.").
31 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002)
(quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
2 Rogers, supra note 2, at 512-13.
3 See United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 176 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[C]ourts
have not settled on a single framework for analyzing warrantless searches at air-
port checkpoints"); Rogers, supra note 2, at 512-13.
34 Rogers, supra note 2, at 512-13.
3 See id. at 518-32.
36 See id. at 538-41, 544.
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as well as the shifting attitudes of the government and the travel-
ing public since 2001, a new approach may be necessary.
1. The Stop-and-Frisk Search
Before 1973, "airlines were required only to stop and search
those persons fitting a specially-designed 'hijack' profile."3 Peo-
ple that fit the profile were asked to go through a metal detec-
tor.3 1 If they triggered the metal detector twice-after emptying
their pockets-they were asked for identification.40 Lack of
identification would lead to "a frisk of [their] person [s]."
The stop-and-frisk framework justified airport searches for a
time, but in United States v. Davis, the Ninth Circuit rejected Terry
v. Ohio4 2-the foundation for the stop-and-frisk framework-as
"inapposite to the validity of pre-boarding screening searches of
passengers and luggage." 4 The stop-and-frisk framework cannot
be applied to airport security for two reasons: "(1) [cases like
Terry] impose a requirement for justification of individual
searches that pre-boarding screening searches cannot meet, and
(2) they permit searches [that] are in some respects more ex-
treme, and in other respects less so, than required to meet the
need relied upon to justify pre-boarding screening searches."4 4
Discarding stop-and-frisk in favor of a new framework in the air-
port security context left Terry and its progeny open for contin-
ued use by law enforcement while allowing the courts to become
more comfortable with the increasingly intrusive security mea-
sures used at airport security checkpoints.4 5
37 Other scholars have suggested as much. See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 7, at
209-10, 225-29 (arguing for a return to the "special needs doctrine"); Rogers,
supra note 2, at 541-48 (arguing for a modified critical-zone approach).
38 WiLLIAM E. RINGEL ET AL., SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS
§ 16:4 (2d ed. 2012) (stating that "the FAA mandated the screening of all passen-
gers and carry-on luggage [in 1973]"). See also Aircraft Security, Screening Sys-
tem, 37 Fed. Reg. 2500, 2500 (Feb. 2, 1972).
3 RINGEL ET AL., supra note 38.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
4 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled by United
States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
4 Id. at 906 (distinguishing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
4 See Davis, 482 F.2d at 907.
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2. The Critical-Zone Approach
The critical-zone approach developed as an extension to the
stop-and-frisk framework.4 6 A pair of 1973 Fifth Circuit decisions
"set forth the extent of the critical zone doctrine. "47 One of the
first decisions using the approach was United States v. Moreno."8
Starting with a Terry frisk, the court held that "the airport was a
'critical zone' and, therefore, subject to special Fourth Amend-
ment considerations." 4 9
In United States v. Skipwith, the court clarified that there is a
different standard for searches performed in the airport gener-
ally and for those performed at the gate.5 0 The reasonableness
of the search depended on "the potential harm to the public,
the probability that the search would avert the potential harm,
and the degree and nature to which the search intruded into
the individual's privacy."5
Opponents of the critical-zone approach as applied to
searches in the general area of the airport charge that "its appli-
cation oversteps the limitations of the [stop-and-frisk] excep-
tion."5 2 For searches performed at the boarding gate, however,
later "decisions have held that those who present themselves for
boarding on an aircraft are subject to a search of their persons
and effects on the basis of mere suspicion alone."5 3
3. Consent
Any search can be performed without a warrant if a person
gives voluntary and intelligent consent.54 Whether consent is
"voluntary or . .. the product of duress or coercion, express or
implied, is to be determined by the totality of all the
circumstances."5 5
46 Rogers, supra note 2, at 528-29.
47 Id. at 530.
48 Id. at 528; United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973).
49 Rogers, supra note 2, at 529.
50 United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973).
51 Rogers, supra note 2, at 529-30 (analyzing Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275-76).
52 Id. at 531.
53 Id. at 531-32. Note that the administrative-search exception, used for evalu-
ating modern airport searches, does not even require mere suspicion. See infra
note 75 and accompanying text.
54 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
5 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980) (citing Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 227).
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Consent is often a preferred approach for the government.5*
Notwithstanding any Fourth Amendment protections, any time
an individual consents to a search, it may be lawfully per-
formed.5 7 In many cases, the government agent wishing to per-
form the search need not inform the individual of her right to
refuse a search."
In United States v. Davis, the Ninth Circuit established a three-
prong test for determining the reasonableness of a pre-flight
search. 9 One element of that test was that "potential passengers
may avoid the search by electing not to fly."60 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that to be reasonable, "an administrative screening
search must be as limited in its intrusiveness as is consistent with
satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies it."61 It then
"follows that airport screening searches are valid only if they rec-
ognize the right of a person to avoid search by electing not to
board the aircraft."6 2 In other words, the search's validity re-
quired allowing the traveler to walk away from the proposed
search.
Many other cases over the years followed Davis. Including pas-
senger consent as an element further strengthened airport se-
curity searches against Fourth Amendment scrutiny.6 3
But in 2007, the Ninth Circuit reversed course. In United States
v. Aukai, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "requiring that a po-
tential passenger be allowed to revoke consent to an ongoing
airport security search makes little sense in a post-9/11 world."6 4
56 See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 227.
59 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled by United
States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (" [A] screening of passengers and of
the articles that will be accessible to them in flight does not exceed constitutional
limitations provided [(1)] that the screening process is no more extensive nor
intensive than necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the pres-
ence of weapons or explosives, [(2)] that it is confined in good faith to that
purpose, and [(3)] that potential passengers may avoid the search by electing not
to fly.").
60 Id.
61 Id. at 910.
62 Id. at 910-11.
63 Even if a court's analysis under a different approach was not bulletproof, by
reinforcing it with the additional element of consent, a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion would be almost impossible to find. See id. at 913.
64 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Cir-
cuit's rejection of consent makes sense from a security standpoint, but the legal
analysis is not so easy. Before 9/11, courts stressed that the ability to walk away
from a security screening was always necessary for that screening to survive
510
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To do so "would afford terrorists multiple opportunities to at-
tempt to penetrate airport security by 'electing not to fly' on the
cusp of detection until a vulnerable portal is found."65 It "would
also allow terrorists a low-cost method of detecting systematic
vulnerabilities in airport security, knowledge that could be ex-
tremely valuable in planning future attacks."6 6 Thus concerned,
the Ninth Circuit expressly overruled any of its cases that "predi-
cated the reasonableness of an airport screening search upon
either ongoing consent or irrevocable implied consent."6 7
Another concern with using consent for Fourth Amendment
considerations at the airport is whether agreeing to pass
through airport security represents true consent. This situation
presents somewhat of a Hobson's choice. There is no other op-
tion; if a person wishes to fly commercially, she must submit to
TSA screening procedures." But courts have held this to not be
a constitutional concern: "[T]he Constitution does not guaran-
tee the right to travel by any particular form of transportation";
therefore, an individual "does not possess a fundamental right
to travel by airplane even though it is the most convenient mode
of travel for him."'6 Such a conclusion is unlikely to satisfy the
prospective business traveler or young adventurer who wishes to
avoid the Morton's fork between AIT screening and an en-
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Davis, 482 F.2d at 913. The Ninth Circuit emphati-
cally made this point itself in Davis. Id. Yet in Aukai, the Ninth Circuit simply
stated that "[t]he constitutionality of an airport screening search . . . does not
depend on consent." Aukai, 497 F.3d at 960. Curiously, the only support offered
by the court for this assertion was the Supreme Court's holding in United States v.
Biswell that the legality of "a regulatory inspection system of business premises
that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope . . . depends not on consent but
on the authority of a valid statute." Id. at 959-60 (citing United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972)).
65 Aukai, 497 F.3d at 960-61 (footnotes omitted).
66 Id. at 961.
67 Id. at 962.
68 Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2006); Bob Burns, Passen-
gers Who Refuse Screening Are Denied Access to the Secure Area, TSA BLOC (an. 23,
2012, 7:23 PM), http://blog.tsa.gov/2012/01/passengers-who-refuse-screening-
are.html. Many people in the United States actually did decide to give up flying
after the TSA began using AIT scanners as the primary screening method. See
Why We Campaign, WE WON'T FLY, http://wewontfly.com/why/ (last visited Sept.
21, 2013).
69 Gilmore, 435 F.3d at 1136-37. But note that while the Constitution may not
guarantee the right to air travel, statutory law does. See 49 U.S.C. § 4 0103(a) (2)
(2006) ("A citizen of the United States has a public right of transit through the
navigable airspace.").
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hanced pat-down,7 0 either of which may make him feel that his
personal privacy is being violated.
4. The Administrative-Search Exception
As courts turned away from the earlier frameworks, they be-
gan to apply the administrative-search exception. In recent
years, the administrative-search framework has been the doc-
trine of choice for courts analyzing Fourth Amendment con-
cerns related to airport security."
At the core of the administrative-search exception is a balanc-
ing of the government's legitimate interests and the individual's
right to be free from government intrusion. Beyond this basic
test, however, courts have differed in their application of the
administrative-search exception to airport security cases.
Most circuits view airport security screening as an "administra-
tive search,"7 which allows for a balancing of "the individual's
privacy expectations against the [g]overnment's interests to de-
termine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some
level of individualized suspicion in the particular context."7 5 In
the context of "blanket suspicionless searches," the Supreme
Court explained that a reasonable search must be "calibrated to
70 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) ("[A]ny passenger may opt-out of AIT screening in favor of a [pat-
down], which allows him to decide which of the two options for detecting a con-
cealed, nonmetallic weapon or explosive is least invasive.").
71 See, e.g., id. ("[S]creening passengers at an airport is an 'administrative
search"'); see also United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) ("We
hold that the search was permissible under the administrative search doctrine.");
United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Airport screenings
of passengers and their baggage constitute administrative searches and are sub-
ject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment.").
72 See Rogers, supra note 2, at 524. Perhaps a more cynical way of viewing the
real-world results of the exception is to say that "governments are sovereign and
sovereignty means being able to violate the constitutional rights of small fry with-
out making them whole." Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doc-
trine, 114 I-Hv. L. REV. 26, 78 (2000). That is, where the government's interests
outweigh those of the individual, the individual ultimately loses.
73 This problem has been exacerbated by the fact that the Supreme Court has
never specifically addressed the question of what framework is most appropriate
for analyzing airport security cases. Reinert, supra note 7, at 219.
74 See, e.g., Marquez, 410 F.3d at 616 ("Airport screenings of passengers and
their baggage constitute administrative searches and are subject to the limitations
of the Fourth Amendment."). The Supreme Court has never expressly held that
airport security measures are administrative searches. See United States v. Aukai,
497 F.3d 955, 959 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007).
75 Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989).
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the risk" and referred to airport security as it existed in 1997 as
one example of such a search.7' But the Court added the caveat
that "where . . . public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the
Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no mat-
ter how conveniently arranged."7 7 In sum, determining the con-
stitutionality of a suspicionless checkpoint search requires
balancing the "'gravity of the public concerns served by the
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public in-
terest, and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty.' "78
a. TSA Is Not Law Enforcement
One key consideration in determining the scope of a Fourth
Amendment exception for modern airport security is how to
characterize TSA screening agents. Different Fourth Amend-
ment evaluation standards exist for armed forces, law enforce-
ment, and administrative agency employees.
The TSA's mission is to "[p]rotect the [n]ation's transporta-
tion systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and
commerce."79 Yet "[t]he legal system doesn't generally allow the
government to stop the potentially dangerous before they commit
crimes."so Only the "U.S. armed forces and intelligence agen-
cies"-of which the TSA is neither-"exist to pre-empt enemy
attacks.""' The Consititution does not prevent armed forces and
intelligence agencies from making preemptive strikes because
the military does not operate under "vague legal balancing
tests"; rather, the military operates under the "clarity of the rules
of war," which provide that troops "have the right to use force
against enemy armed forces at any time, not merely at the mo-
76 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
77 Id.
78 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426-27 (2004) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 51 (1979)); see also Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
455 (1990) (examining the effect of sobriety checkpoints on reducing drunk
driving to determine whether such checkpoints were reasonable); United States
v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973) ("The equation must also take
into account the likelihood that the search procedure will be effective in averting
the potential harm.").
79 Mission, Vision and Core Values, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/mission-
vision-and-core-values (last modified Mar. 25, 2013).
80 John Yoo, The Real Problem with Obama's Drone Memo, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7,
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ment before 'an operational leader' ... seizes a plane or places
a bomb."8 2
In contrast, for law enforcement to perform a search, the of-
ficer must either have a warrant or have at least a "reasonable
suspicion" of a crime-such as in a Terry frisk." The search's
allowable intrusiveness depends on either the scope of the war-
rant or the level of suspicion.8 4 The courts, however, moved
away from evaluating airport searches under Terry precisely be-
cause airport searches were too different from those performed
by law enforcement officers.8 5
Courts have made it clear that the TSA is not a law enforce-
ment agency and TSA employees are not law enforcement of-
ficers." "[T]here can be no doubt that neither the [DHS] nor
the [TSA] is a public law enforcement agency within the con-
templation of the statute. Neither agency has as its predominant
purpose or mission the enforcement of penal laws."" Instead,
"both agencies are statutorily organized and authorized to pro-
tect national securty."8" The TSA "security functions do not in-
volve . . . traditional law enforcement functions . . . like the
investigation of crime, or the arrest, prosecution [,] or detention
of criminal suspects.""
The remaining standard for evaluating TSA airport searches is
as an administrative search. If a government interest exists "be-
yond the normal need for law enforcement," an administrative
authority may perform a reasonable search to fulfill the govern-
82 Id. The military must use different rules for terrorists than ordinary courts
use for criminals because " [b]y pretending to treat terrorists as if they were ordi-
nary criminal suspects, the government makes it more likely that ordinary sus-
pects will be treated as if they were terrorists." James Taranto, Not the Drones They
Thought They Knew, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324196204578298094023943834.html.
83 See Rogers, supra note 2, at 519-20.
84 See id.
85 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
86 See People v. Speer, 255 P.3d 1115, 1122 (Colo. 2011).
87 Id.
88 Id. (citing 6 U.S.C. § 111(b) (1) ("'The primary mission of [the DHS] is to
... prevent terrorist attacks within the United States[,]' [and under] 49 U.S.C.
§ 114(d) [, the] TSA Under Secretary [is] responsible for 'security in all modes of
transportation.'")).
89 Id. (citing 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(2) ("[P]rimary responsibility for investigating
and prosecuting acts of terrorism shall be vested not in [the DHS], but rather in




ment's interest. 0 But therein lies the difficulty with the TSA's
position; TSA agents have less constitiutional wiggle room than
their armed forces or law enforcement counterparts, yet the
TSA's mission to "[p]rotect the [n]ation's transportation sys-
tems" implicates power akin to that granted to the armed forces
under the "rules of war."9'
As a result, some federal courts have struggled with the ques-
tion of defining the TSA. In Electronic Privacy Information Center,
the D.C. Circuit dismissed the question out of hand, stating that
the argument that "the TSA does not engage in 'law enforce-
ment, correctional, or intelligence activity' borders upon the
silly."92 Other courts have rightly recognized that the TSA's ac-
tions must be limited to the administrative ends of protecting
national security. "Given the broad discretion already granted to
TSA agents to search the traveling public, it is important to de-
ter unconstitutional conduct and to ensure that [the] TSA's
broad powers are not improperly exploited for law-enforcement
purposes.""
b. Circuit Split on the Test for Weighing Administrative
Searches
There is a circuit split regarding the appropriate test for de-
termining the constitutionality of airport security search proce-
dures. The Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions that
some kinds of warrantless searches need not employ the least
intrusive means available to be consistent with the Fourth
Amendment." But note that the Court has not addressed air-
90 Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989).
91 Mission, Vision and Core Values, supra note 79. Note, however, that even the
rules of war do not allow the military unfettered discretion, particularly in rela-
tion to U.S. citizens within the nation's boundaries. Even the rules of war require
that a citizen "associate [himself] with the military arm of the enemy govern-
ment" in order for the military to have the right to engage that individual in
battle. Yoo, supra note 80.
92 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C.
Cir. 2011). Because it completely dismissed the question, the court failed to ad-
dress how the case would be affected if TSA search agents were not law enforce-
ment. See id.
93 United States v. Fofana, 666 F.3d 985, 994 (6th Cir. 2012) (Moore, K.,
dissenting).
94 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632-33 (2010) (police depart-
ment's audit of employee's pager messages was not unreasonable despite depart-
ment's failure to use the least instrusive means in reviewing the messages);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663-65 (1995) (school district's
random drug testing of athletes was not unreasonable despite the availability of
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port security specifically. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has, on several
occasions when considering whether a warrantless search in the
airport security context was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, affirmed its rule that an airport screening search
must be no more intrusive than necessary.9 5
But the D.C. Circuit rejected the no-more-intrusive-than-nec-
essary approach in 2010 when considering whether warrantless
searches using AIT scanners were acceptable under the Fourth
Amendment.' 6 The D.C. Circuit cited the Supreme Court's lan-
guage from Quon, which said that "[t]his Court has 'repeatedly
refused to declare that only the least intrusive search practicable
can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'"" This ap-
proach, the direct opposite of that taken by the Ninth Circuit,
created a circuit split. Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit did not ac-
knowledge or address the requirement that for an administra-
tive search, "the means employed must bear 'a close and
less intrusive means, namely "drug testing on suspicion of drug use"); Bd. of
Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002) (school dis-
trict's blanket drug testing of all students who participate in competitive extracur-
ricular activities was not unreasonable despite the availability of less intrusive
means); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) (police inventory search of
arrested person's container or articles in possession was not unreasonable when
done in accordance with established inventory procedures, even if it may have
been less intrusive to seal the container or article instead of search it); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976) (holding that immigration
border checkpoints are not unreasonable given the strong public interest and
minimal intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests, despite the argument that
there are less intrusive means to achieving the same end; but the Court also con-
tended that there may not actually be less intrusive means in this case). Note that
none of the cases cited by Quon, which the D.C. Circuit relied on in Electronic
Privacy Information Center, dealt with airport security. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at
2626-35. The closest case was Martinez-Fuerte, but even then the Court only ana-
lyzed procedures at a border checkpoint. See id. Furthermore, the Court empha-
sized the extremely minimal intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights-most
notably that "[n]either the vehicle or its occupants are searched." Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. at 558.
95 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973)).
96 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
97 Id.; Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2632 (internal quotation marks omitted). Note that
Quon was a case addressing the "'special needs' of the workplace" exception, not
airport security. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630. In addition, the D.C. Circuit ignored
the fact that the Supreme Court elsewhere in its opinion repeatedly noted the
importance of analyzing "whether the search was too intrusive." See, e.g., id. at
2631.
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substantial relation' to the government's interest in pursuing
the search."98
Either approach may potentially be the correct one. The
Ninth Circuit's approach remains consistent with its prior case
law on airport security measures.9 9 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has never expressly held that an airport security search
amounts to an administrative search.100 In fact, the Court has
not even considered any case relating to the Fourth Amend-
ment concerns raised by airport security measures for many
years, and certainly not since 2001.101 Because the Court's other
cases were not related to airport security, 10 2 it is possible that the
Ninth Circuit considered the Supreme Court's language re-
jecting the least-intrusive-means framework to be inapplicable.
One possible justification for such an approach is that "[w] here
a special need exists, 'what is required is a fact-specific balancing
of the intrusion . .. against the promotion of legitimate govern-
mental interests' to determine if the program is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment."0 ' In airports, it may be reason-
able to hold the government to a stricter standard-the least
intrusive means necessary-because the airport search is already
necessarily more intrusive than some of the other types of
searches analyzed by the Court. Airport searches are warrantless,
universally applied even in the absence of reasonable suspicion,
and physically intrusive-passengers are either subjected to AIT
scanners or enhanced pat-downs.
On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit's approach may retain
merit because the Supreme Court's language is broad. Arguably,
there are no significant disparities between these various Fourth
Amendment contexts. In a field that is closely analogous to air-
9 Compare Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d 1, with United States v. Lifshitz, 369
F.3d 173, 190-92 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (stating that a search should
"not sweep so broadly as to draw a wide swath of extraneous material into its
net"). Maybe the D.C. Circuit thought this issue was too obvious for words, but its
failure to address it simply leads to more confusion regarding the proper ap-
proach to considering Fourth Amendment concerns as they relate to airport
security.
9 See Aukai, 497 F.3d at 962 (quoting Davis, 482 F.2d at 913).
100 Id. at 959 n.2.
101 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
102 See cases cited supra note 94.
103 MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921RMBFM, 2005 WL 3338573, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005), affd 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting N.G. v. Con-
necticut, 382 F.3d 225, 231 (2d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(addressing the New York City subway inspection program where inspectors ran-
domly stopped passengers to inspect containers).
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port security-border checkpoint screening-the Supreme
Court rejected the limitation that the chosen search method be
the "least intrusive means."104
The other circuits remain scattered. The Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits align with the Ninth Circuit in requiring that an airport
screening search be no more intrusive than necessary.o 5 The
Second Circuit's position is subject to multiple valid interpreta-
tions, and thus is unclear.'o The Third Circuit's position on the
question is also unclear; in United States v. Hartwell, the Third
Circuit held that progressively intrusive search procedures did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because they were "mini-
mally intrusive."1 0 7 But in a footnote, the court noted that in so
holding, it declined to set "the outer limits of intrusiveness in
the airport context."o 8 In the same footnote, the court went on
to clarify that it was refraining from "devis [ing] any bright-line
test" for future cases; instead, the court was merely holding that
the particular search under review was acceptable under Brown's
weighing of the "'gravity of the public concerns served by the
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public in-
104 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-64 (1976).
10 Compare United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1973)
("The search procedures have every indicia of being the most efficacious that
could be used."), and United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 776-77 (11th Cir.
1984) (quoting Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275), with Aukai, 497 F.3d 955.
10 Compare United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting
that "to be reasonable the search must be as limited as possible commensurate
with the performance of its functions"), with Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 80
(2d Cir. 2006) ("[W]hat matters" at a ferry security checkpoint "is not whether
the defendants could have . . . devis[ed] a less intrusive means of searching pas-
sengers, but whether the means they chose unconstitutionally trenched on plain-
tiffs' privacy interests in an unreasonable way"); see also VanBrocklen v. United
States, 410 F. App'x 378, 379-80 (2d Cir. 2011) (dismissing a pro se litigant's
Fourth Amendment claim, noting that "'[r]easonableness under the Fourth
Amendment does not require employing the least intrusive means"' (quoting Bd.
of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002))). It is
interesting to note that although the Cassidy court claimed that the government
need not "employ[ ] the least intrusive means," it upheld the "search of carry-on
baggage . . . [as] minimally intrusive." Cassidy, 471 F.3d at 80-81.
107 United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178-81 (3d Cir. 2006). Reasonable
minds can differ on Hartwell's meaning. For example, the petitioner in Electronic
Privacy Information Center used Hartwell to argue for the least intrusive means test,
while the court used Hartwell to argue against the least intrusive means test. See
Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10-11 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (citing Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180).
108 Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180 & n.10.
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terest, and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty.' "109
The existence of a circuit split provides further evidence that
the proper method of analysis for airport security searches re-
mains unclear. Even among different courts applying the admin-
istrative-search doctrine, the outcome may differ depending on
the specific prongs of the particular test used in that circuit.
c. Privacy Concerns
In determining the reasonableness of a search, the Fourth
Amendment requires a consideration of "the degree to which
[the security measure] intrudes upon an individual's privacy."110
Indeed, in many cases, a holding of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment may be strengthened precisely because a
particular search technique is so unintrusive." 1 It logically fol-
lows that the opposite may be true as well.1 12
In the airport security context, even minor privacy violations
can escalate into major concerns. TSA officers search millions of
passengers every day."' Any Fourth Amendment violation is a
problem; when multiplied by millions, unacceptable. Because of
the "sacred nature" of the Fourth Amendment,"' the adminis-
trative-search doctrine balances the government interest (dis-
cussed below") against the privacy interests of the individual
being searched.
The most well-known privacy concern related to airport secur-
ity has arisen in the last few years with the installation of AIT
scanners as the primary screening method used at airports na-
tionwide. 1 6 A national backlash occurred, and everything from
109 Id. at 178-79, 180 n.10 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).
110 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
MH See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-60 (1976)
("[Tihe . .. intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is quite limited.").
112 That is, a search becomes less reasonable as the search technique becomes
more intrusive.
11 See TSA Myth or Fact: Leaked Images, Handcuffed Hosts, Religious Garb, and
More!, TSA BLOG (Nov. 18, 2010), http://blog.tsa.gov/2010/11/tsa-myth-or-fact-
leaked-images.html.
114 See, e.g., Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 1974) ("The sacred-
ness of a person's ... right of personal privacy ... [is a] paramount considera-
tion[ ] in our country and [is] specifically protected by the Fourth
Amendment."); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000)
("[A] person's body and home [are] areas afforded the greatest Fourth Amend-
ment protection.").
115 See infra Part II.C.4.d.
116 See Deal, supra note 16, at 526-27.
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passengers wearing anti-TSA t-shirts' 1 7 to stripping at security
checkpoints" 8 has been the norm ever since.1 '
One reason for potential privacy concerns is that AIT scan-
ners are different in kind from previous scanning technology.o2 0
Magnetometers and metal-detecting wands merely detect
whether metal is present, but AIT scanners, by contrast, produce
images of unclothed individual passengers.'2 ' In Electronic Pri-
vacy Information Center, the D.C. Circuit-which upheld the con-
stitutionality of AIT scanners against Fourth Amendment
review-acknowledged that "it is clear that by producing an im-
age of the unclothed passenger, an AIT scanner intrudes upon
his or her personal privacy in a way a magnetometer does
not."'2 2 The court also concluded that "the TSA's policy substan-
tially changes the experience of airline passengers."' 2  Some
have argued that such scans amount to a "virtual strip search."124
Such sentiments are shared by at least a portion of the public, as
evidenced by the public outcry against the use of AIT scanners
as the primary scanning method in all airports.'2 5
The D.C. Circuit also found the TSA's steps to protect passen-
ger privacy to be adequate. 2 " "[W] e must acknowledge the steps
the TSA has already taken to protect passenger privacy, in par-
117 See, e.g., I Was Molested by the TSA T-Shirts, ZAZZLE, http://www.zazzle.com/
iwasmolestedbythetsat shirts-235344171002364128 (last visited Sept. 22,
2013).
11s Man Strips at Oregon Airport to Protest Security Measures, REuTERs (Apr. 18,
2012, 3:38 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/18/us-usa-strip-air-
port-idUSBRE83H17Z20120418.
119 Such a reaction from the public is problematic because "controversial pro-
grams require public support to be sustained. . . . 'Otherwise [the President is]
going to find [him]self in a politically vulnerable position.'" Peter Baker, Obama's
Turn in Bush's Bind, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
02/10/world/obamas-turn-in-bushs-bind-with-defense-policies.html (discussing
President Obama's evolution on anti-terror policies, and how his policies com-
pare to those of President George W. Bush).
120 Reinert, supra note 7, at 220 n.75.
121 See id.
122 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
123 Id. at 7.
124 E.g., Stancombe, supra note 5, at 210 (arguing that AIT body scanners are
the equivalent of virtual strip searches and therefore violate the Fourth
Amendment).
125 See, e.g., Kim Zetter, National Opt-Out Day Called Against Invasive Body Scan-
ners, WIRED (Nov. 12, 2010, 6:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/
11/national-opt-out/ (activists calling for passengers to decline AIT scans and
enhanced pat-downs on "National Opt-Out Day").
126 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10-11.
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ticular distorting the image created using AIT and deleting it as
soon as the passenger has been cleared."1 2 No other circuit has
explicitly considered AIT scanners from a constitutional per-
spective, but it is telling that the D.C. Circuit found the TSA's
privacy-protection measures to be adequate. Normally the Su-
preme Court does not allow unconstitutional statutes-or gov-
ernment actions-to stand "merely because the [g] overnment
promise [d] to use [them] responsibly."12 8 Yet in 2011-before
Congress changed the law to require the TSA to protect passen-
ger privacy' 2 9 -the D.C. Circuit held that the Fourth Amend-
ment or related privacy concerns13 0 do not prevent the TSA
from using AIT scanners."' The court performed no analysis of
whether the use of AIT scanners actually improved security and
simply ignored or rejected the privacy concerns. 13 2 The only real
127 Id. But note that this reasoning is flawed. It does not matter what privacy
intrusions the government is not making (i.e., "the steps the TSA has already
taken to protect passenger privacy"); instead, what matters is what privacy intru-
sions the TSA is still making. Id. at 10. "It is the objective effect of the [s]tate's
actions on the privacy of the individual that animates the Fourth Amendment."
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 52 (2000) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
128 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 462 (2010). This argument is particu-
larly compelling in the body scanner context because despite the government's
promise that scans produced using AIT scanners cannot be saved, some have
been. See, e.g., Joel Johnson, One Hundred Naked Citizens: One Hundred Leaked Body
Scans, GIZMODO (Nov. 16, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://gizmodo.com/5690749/
these-are-the-first-100-leaked-body-scans (describing a millimeter wave scanner in
a Florida federal courthouse on which U.S. Marshals had improperly saved
35,000 images of scans of individuals); see also Baker, supra note 119 ("'We make
policy assuming that people in power might abuse it. To do otherwise is
foolish.'").
129 See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 826,
126 Stat. 11, 132 (2012) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(1)).
130 One of several privacy concerns was that "the Chief Privacy Officer of the
DHS failed to discharge her statutory duties generally to 'assur[e] that the use of
technologies' does not 'erode [ ] privacy protections' and, more specifically, to
make an assessment of the rule's impact upon privacy." Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653
F.3d at 8-9 (citing 6 U.S.C. § 142(a) (1), (4)). The Chief Privacy Officer's most
recent assessment at the time had been made nearly two years earlier in 2009,
before the TSA "decided to extend the use of AIT from primary screening at six
airports . . . to primary screening at every airport." Id. at 9. But the court "in-
fer[red] from the absence of any subsequent assessment" that the Chief Privacy
Officer had made "a determination ... that her prior efforts remain [ed] suffi-
cient." Id. Such a non sequitur would be problematic in any case, but it is espe-
cially disturbing in this case because the Fourth Amendment is so strongly
protected in almost all other contexts. See, e.g., Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480,
483 (5th Cir. 1974).
13 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 11.
132 See id. at 10-11.
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reasoning offered by the court for its outcome was "the obvious
need for the TSA to continue its airport security operations
without interruption."" But such reasoning does not constitute
the balancing required by the analysis; instead, the court is sup-
posed to examine whether evidence showing the effectiveness of
the given security measure-in this case, the use of AIT scan-
ners-furthers the government interest, and if so, to what extent
it does so. 3 4
Congress has taken steps to require the TSA to consider pas-
sengers' privacy concerns. In 2012, Congress passed the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, which includes a sec-
tion on "[p]rivacy protections for air passenger screening with
advanced imaging technology."' 3 This law requires that "any ad-
vanced imaging technology used for the screening of passen-
gers" be "equipped with and employ [ ] automatic target
recognition software; and . .. compl [y] with such other require-
ments as the Assistant Secretary [of Homeland Security] deter-
mines necessary to address privacy considerations." 3 6
In other contexts-particularly the national-security excep-
tion as it relates to warrantless electronic surveillance-the
Court has been more eager to avoid involvement by simply al-
lowing Congress to exercise a check on the Executive Branch.
With the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Congress
has codified privacy measures with regard to AIT scanners.13 7
But it remains to be seen whether those privacy portions of the
statute are carried out by the Executive.1 3 1
133 Id. at 11.
134 For further discussion of the D.C. Circuit's flawed reasoning, see R. Gregory
Israelsen, The D.C. Circuit's EPIC Failure in Electronic Privacy Information Center
v. United States Department of Homeland Security, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. (forth-
coming 2013).
135 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 826, 126
Stat. 11, 132 (2012) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(l)).
136 Id.
137 See id.
138 In other contexts, the TSA has proven uncooperative in complying with
externally imposed restrictions. See, e.g., infra note 212 and accompanying text.
But also note that the TSA recently announced that it would remove its last 174
backscatter scanners from airports, replacing them with the less intrusive millime-
ter wave scanners.Jack Nicas, TSA to Halt Revealing Body Scans at Airports, WALL ST.J. (Jan. 18, 2013, 6:15 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732
3783704578250152613273568.html. ByJune 1, 2013, all airport scanners will "fil-
ter images to depict only potentially hazardous items on a generic human silhou-




Balanced against the interests of individuals-to be free from
government intrusion and to maintain privacy of their persons
and possessions-is the government's interest in protecting its
citizens. "It is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation."'"
No one wants another 9/11.140
Nevertheless, when considering the reasonableness of
searches, the Court requires that each incremental change in the
search procedure be shown to improve security. 14 1 The Fourth
Amendment is too sacred to accept anything less. 14 2
The natural question to ask when balancing a previously un-
considered search procedure with the Fourth Amendment's rea-
sonableness requirement is to what extent the search furthers
the government's interest. That is, when the TSA implements
new technology or a new search procedure, the question should
be whether the new technology or technique actually results in
an increase in public safety. 143 If an improvement has been
made, the amount of improvement should then be considered.
This increase in privacy benefits is then weighed against the in-
crease in privacy costs to the individual.1 4
Regardless of whether a given search procedure is "no more
intrusive than necessary," 145 an objective analysis of whether the
139 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec'y of State,
378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)).
140 See, e.g., United States v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940, 944 n.1 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he
events of September 11, 2001, only emphasize the heightened need to conduct
searches at this nation's international airports.").
141 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979) ("[W]e are unconvinced
that the incremental contribution to . . . safety of the [search procedure] justifies
the practice under the Fourth Amendment.").
14 See cases cited supra note 114.
143 If there is no improvement in security, there is no legally justifiable reason
to intrude on an individual's Fourth Amendment interest in privacy. See, e.g.,
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659. The administrative-search exception does not apply in
such cases because the procedure under review does not actually improve secur-
ity and thus offers nothing to the government interest side of the balancing test.
Of course, cynics point out that politicians may be interested in "security thea-
ter"-making security changes for show to convince the public that the govern-
ment is responding in some way-but such changes ought to hold no weight in a
Fourth Amendment analysis.
144 As discussed elsewhere in this article, the problem is that courts often do
not actually perform this balancing; they merely pay lip service to the administra-
tive-search analysis.
145 See supra Part II.C.4.b.
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search procedure, as implemented, is effective at preventing air
terrorism may have a bearing on the Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness of the given search procedure.1 4 6
For example, in the case of AIT scanners, security experts are
divided about the security improvements actually achieved by
the scanners. 1 4 7 Outside of the TSA's own studies-which for
obvious reasons are likely to find only one outcome1 4 8-few ana-
lysts have said that post-2001 TSA procedures are completely ef-
fective at improving the safety of air travel.14 9 Even other
members of the government have pointed out the less-than-stel-
lar results of AIT scanners: the Office of the Inspector General
"identified vulnerabilities in the screening process at the passen-
ger screening checkpoint at the domestic airports where [it]
146 Such an analysis would be appropriate in any other administrative-search
analysis. See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte v. United States, 428 U.S. 543, 569 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). But
after 9/11, no court has ever performed a rigorous balancing of the effectiveness
of a new airport security measure against its intrusion on privacy. See, e.g., Elec.
Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10-11 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (where the D.C. Circuit did not consider any objective measures related to
the effectiveness of AIT scanner technology).
147 See Leon Kaufman & Joseph W. Carlson, An Evaluation ofAirport X-Ray Back-
scatter Units Based on Image Characteristics, 4J. TRANsp. SEC. 73 (2011); infta notes
148-49 and accompanying text.
148 See BRUCE SCHNEIER, LIARS AND OUTLIERS: ENABLING THE TRUST THAT SocI-
ETY NEEDS TO THRIVE 199, 201 (2012).
[T] he TSA has a self-preservation interest... . The TSA ... would
never suggest returning airport security to pre-9/11 levels and giv-
ing the rest of its budget back so it could be spent on broader anti-
terrorism measures that might make more sense, such as intelli-
gence, investigation, and emergency response. It's a solution that
goes against the interests of the TSA as an institution.
Id.
149 By contrast, there are multiple examples of security experts finding that
most post-9/11 security measures have not improved airplane security. See, e.g.,
infra note 218 and accompanying text; see also Kaufman & Carlson, supra note
147, at 73 (discussing the security flaws in body-scanners); Bruce Schneier, Video
Shows TSA Full-Body Scanner Failure, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Mar. 12, 2012),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/03/videoshowstsa.html
(Schneier describes a video "showing a blogger walking through two different
types of full-body scanners with metal objects. Basically, by placing the object on
your side, the black image is hidden against the scanner's black background.");
Nacktscanner bei Markus Lanz, YouTUBE (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=nrKvweNugnQ (clip of German TV segment showing a body scan-
ner catching a subject's cell phone and swiss-army knife, but missing all the com-
ponents to make a bomb).
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conducted testing."150 It concluded that "improvements can be
made in the operation of new passenger screening technologies
to prevent individuals with threat objects from entering airport
sterile areas undetected."5 1
e. A Difficult Balancing Act
In practice, the administrative-search analysis's required bal-
ancing presents a difficult task for courts. On one hand, a judge
is faced with upholding the individual liberties that the Constitu-
tion was enshrined to protect. On the other hand, no court
wants to create a security weakness in the name of liberty that
could later be exploited by terrorists.1 2
The balancing portion of the analysis is meant to limit the
scope of the exception. But many courts and members of the
public may ask why the scope of such an exception matters at
all. "We don't want another 9/11, so the inconvenience or loss
of privacy is worth it," so the saying goes. And for the most part,
the government has succeeded in preventing additional terrorist
incidents.1 5 1 "In the process, however, government officials have
occasionally lost sight of their mission, or strayed from it, and
have violated individual privacy rights ... ."
One reason the balancing may be so difficult for courts is that
the required facts may not be readily available. There may not
be much evidence in favor of or against the security measure's
effectiveness. Alternatively, there may be convincing evidence
that a large number of travelers feel that their privacy is violated
by the new measure, or no evidence of passenger sentiments at
all. But every case is different because of the nature of the test;
"[t]he balancing test articulated in the airport screening cases
... is fact-sensitive."" The facts are what matter to the analysis.
150 TSA PENETRATION TESTING OF ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY, supra note
14.
151 Id.
152 Notably, this is a false dilemma. The administrative-search exception does
not ask courts to leave openings for terrorists; it merely asks them to weigh search
procedures against the privacy interests of the individual. If a given search tech-
nique significantly improves security and has little impact on privacy, then the
exception allows it. It is only ineffective search techniques, or those that imper-
missibly invade individual privacy interests, that are disallowed.
153 STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAw 477 (4th ed. 2007) ("In
almost every instance, [anti-terrorism] measures have succeeding in protecting
the American people from harm.").
154 Id.
155 Id. at 594.
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Surprisingly, few appellate courts analyzing airport security
measures actually look at the facts of the particular case.15 6
Whether relevant facts are not before the court or the court sim-
ply chooses to ignore them is not clear. For example, in Elec-
tronic Privacy Information Center, the D.C. Circuit failed to
perform any analysis of the facts regarding the security enhance-
ments offered by AIT scanners.'
The balancing portion of the analysis is what protects privacy
rights. Because the government may violate those rights,
"[s]pecial care is .. . required in sorting out protected activities
from those that could lead to violence or serious disruption of
society and in selecting appropriate investigative techniques for
each.""5 s That is, limiting the scope of the exception matters
precisely because it is what makes the exception reasonable.
Thus, by allowing the exception, the Constitution permits rea-
sonable searches to take place, but courts should also limit the
searches that may take place to reasonable ones.
Even if a new technology or search technique results in an
increase in public safety, the test's balancing requirement means
that the increased benefit must be weighed against the corre-
sponding invasion of privacy.15 1 If, for example, a new TSA rule
were implemented that required passengers to remove all cloth-
ing before being scanned, TSA officials would likely find and
prevent an increased number of dangerous items-such as
weapons-from getting past the security checkpoints. As a re-
sult, the government's interest in maintaining safe air travel
would be enhanced, but the corresponding cost to passenger
privacy would be so great that few courts would allow such a
policy to stand.
Of course, placing a limit on the scope of the government
generally-or the TSA specifically-may arguably create an
156 See id. Obviously, appellate courts are not finders of fact. But because the
administrative-search analysis is so fact specific, the appellate court ought to use
the lower court's findings of fact in performing the analysis. See FED. R. Civ. P.
52(a) (6).
157 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1,
10-11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
158 Id.
159 Another approach might be to simply look at whether the new security
measure, standing alone, has any impact on security. This approach seems less
ideal in light of the Court's language requiring that each incremental change in




opening that terrorists may exploit. But such a tradeoff has been
a consideration since the nation's founding:
The tradition of liberty in the United States casts a shadow over
all national security surveillance, and is an overriding problem in
addressing terrorism concerns. The core openness of our society
permits all of us, including the potential terrorist, considerable
freedom to move about, to associate with others, and to act in
furtherance of political aims. As recent terrorist incidents in the
United States have created a sense of urgency among citizens and
government officials to find better preventive strategies, reflec-
tion has also reminded us that hasty actions to thwart terrorism
may threaten the freedoms that permit an open society. Thus, in
seeking ways to investigate potential terrorist activity, just as in
fashioning better responses to terrorist incidents, the measures
adopted must not undermine our basic freedoms. 1 6 0
Courts analyzing airport security measures frequently cite to
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, in which dicta explained that air-
port security checkpoints were not affected by the holding limit-
ing the city's drug interdiction checkpoints because at airports
the need "to ensure public safety can be particularly acute."16'
But merely quoting that line should not exempt courts from
performing the required balancing. Edmond did not exempt air-
port security measures from the administrative-search analysis;
at most, it only adjusted the weight of the relevant factors.1 6 2 To
be exempted from the Fourth Amendment's warrant require-
ment, the government still must have a compelling interest that
outweighs the privacy concerns of the individual.
D. DIFFERENT TIMES, DIFFERENT FRAMEWORK
Since 2001, most courts have applied the administrative-
search theory.'13 But case law in which the administrative-search
exception upholds airport security searches against Fourth
Amendment challenges was primarily developed before the TSA
even existed and before the implementation of many modern
search procedures. This is particularly true with regard to the
1-0 Id. at 478-79.
16, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000).
162 See id. That is, the government interest need not be as strong, or individual
privacy interests must be stronger. A broader interpretation might be that there
is no alternative reading required; Edmond simply acknowledged that the govern-
ment interest is always stronger ("particularly acute"), and therefore the individ-
ual interest requirement is simply correspondingly heightened. See id.
163 Note that this includes the only court to date to consider the constitutional-
ity of AIT scanners. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
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use of AIT scanners and enhanced pat-down techniques. There-
fore, some scholars have argued that the bounds of the excep-
tion may be too narrow for modern search procedures.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has specifically singled out
airport-security searches as being different from other adminis-
trative searches by placing different-fewer-restrictions on air-
port security measures.1 64 This lends further support to the idea
that airport security screening is ill-fitted for analysis under the
administrative-search doctrine. For example, in City of Indianapo-
lis v. Edmond, the Court held that a police narcotics checkpoint
violated the Fourth Amendment.1 5 The majority used a lot of
surprising language, including such dicta as: "the gravity of the
threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what
means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given
purpose."1 66 The Court also hypothesized that "an appropriately
tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack
or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a
particular route" would be acceptable under the Fourth Amend-
ment, but noted that authorities could not "simply stop cars as a
matter of course to see if there just happens to be a felon leav-
ing the jurisdiction."' 6 One could easily imagine how such lan-
guage could be translated to the airport context: "authorities
could not simply stop passengers as a matter of course to see if
there just happens to be a terrorist boarding the plane."' But
lest any future court attempt to use the Supreme Court's limita-
tions on the administrative-search exception in the airport con-
text, the Court finalized its opinion by stating that its holding
"does not affect the validity of border searches or searches at
places like airports and government buildings."' 6' The Court's
reason for excepting those searches was simply that they occur
at places "where the need for such measures to ensure public
safety can be particularly acute."O Such a blanket exception
lends credence to the argument that airport searches should
be-or at least reasonably could be-considered under a differ-
164 See, e.g., Edmond, 531 U.S. 32.
165 Id. at 48.
166 Id. at 42.
167 Id. at 44; see also Yoo, supra note 80 and accompanying text.
168 The author did not find any court that actually attempted to use the
Court's language in this way.
169 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47-48.
170 Id. Later courts that have examined airport searches have pointed to this
language to justify TSA search measures. See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S.
Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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ent Fourth Amendment framework than other administrative
searches.
Given the shortcomings of applying the administrative-search
exception to modern TSA technology and procedures, and the
still-essential government interest in protecting the nation's se-
curity-particularly the safety of air travel-a new approach to
considering Fourth Amendment concerns in the airport security
context is needed. Other scholars have argued for the same."'
This article argues that the national-security exception-tradi-
tionally applied to electronic surveillance-may be an appropri-
ate framework for courts to use when examining the Fourth
Amendment concerns related to airport security.
III. THE NATIONAL-SECURITY EXCEPTION
A. HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL-SECURITY EXCEPTION
In 1928, the Supreme Court held in Olmstead v. United States
that the Fourth Amendment did not cover wiretapping.172 In the
years following, the Attorney General began tapping telephone
lines of "syndicated bootleggers" and in other "exceptional cases
where the crimes [were] substantial and serious, and the neces-
sity [was] great." 7 Wiretapping became "an important law en-
forcement tool." 7 4
Congress restricted the use of wiretapping in the Federal
Communications Act of 1934, which made it illegal for a person
"'to intercept and divulge or publish the contents of wire and
radio communications."' 17 5 But the Justice Department inter-
preted the Act and a subsequent Supreme Court decision con-
struing the Act to mean that "only the interception and
divulgence of [wire communications] outside the Federal estab-
lishment was .. . unlawful," and continued to perform "national
security wiretaps."17 6
In the 1967 Katz v. United States decision, the Court overruled
Olmstead, holding that the Fourth Amendment required war-
rants for electronic surveillance.' 7 7 But the Court specifically ex-
171 See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 2 (arguing for a modified critical-zone
approach).
172 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928).
173 PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF PowERs LAw 693 (3d
ed. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
174 Id.
175 Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964 ed.)).
176 Id.
177 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-59 (1967).
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cepted from its holding cases "involving the national
security."1 7 Congress did the same. In response to Katz, it en-
acted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.179 The Act recognized, and specifically exempted from
limitation,
the constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or po-
tential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain
foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security
of the United States, or to protect national security information
against foreign intelligence activities.'8 o
In 1972, the Supreme Court held in United States v. United
States District Court,'1 also known as the Keith case, that the re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment applied even in cases in-
volving threats to domestic security.18 2 The United States had
charged three defendants with conspiracy to destroy govern-
ment property.183 One of the defendants was also charged with
bombing a CIA office in Michigan.1 8 4 "The government argued
that a warrant was not required because of the President's au-
thority to 'gather intelligence information' and to 'protect the
national security. '"1 The Court acknowledged that "domestic
security surveillance may involve different policy and practical
considerations from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime.'"186 But
even so, the Court held that warrants are still "required for the
type of domestic security surveillance involved in this case."' 8 7
Congress could, however, "consider protective standards" for
surveillance involving the domestic security; those protective
178 Id. at 358 n.23.
179 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2006).
180 United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 2511(3)).
181 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
182 Id. at 324 (holding that "prior judicial approval is required for the type of
domestic security surveillance involved in this case and that such approval may be
made in accordance with such reasonable standards as the Congress may
prescribe").
183 Id. at 299.
184 Id.
185 Michael P. O'Connor & Celia Rumann, Going, Going, Gone: Sealing the Fate of
the Fourth Amendment, 26 FoRiAM INT'L L.J. 1234, 1253 (2003) (quoting U.S. Dist.
Court (Keith), 407 U.S. at 300-01).




standards would "differ from those already prescribed for speci-
fied crimes in Title III."' The Court continued,
Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amend-
ment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate
need of Government for intelligence information and the pro-
tected rights of our citizens. For the warrant application may vary
according to the governmental interest to be enforced and the
nature of citizen rights deserving protection.'"
Thus, although it is reasonable to infer from the case "that
national security wiretaps may not have to meet all the Fourth
Amendment requirements applicable in criminal investiga-
tions," the Court "did not specify what alternative processes
might be appropriate in such cases." 90
In the years after Keith, other courts allowed the Executive
Branch to conduct warrantless surveillance "for the purpose of
gathering foreign intelligence.""' It was in this context that
Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (FISA).192 FISA "established warrant requirements to gov-
ern certain instances of foreign intelligence gathering [ ] and a
process for assembling a panel ofjudges . . . to enforce them." 9 3
After FISA was passed, the Executive Branch "took the position
that it retained inherent authority to conduct so-called 'black
bag jobs,' i.e., surreptitious physical entries onto premises to
search for tangible items."' 9 4 But Congress amended FISA to in-
clude physical searches in 1994195 and has since amended the
Act to include "pen register and trap-and-trace orders . . . and
. . . subpoenas for business records in the hands of third
parties." 96
History shows that the President has the constitutional power
to protect national security. Where Congress has regulated to
require a warrant, the courts have upheld the regulation. But at
nearly every turn, the Executive Branch has filled in the gaps by
performing warrantless searches in the name of national secur-
188 Id.
189 Id. at 322-23.
190 DYCUS ET AL., supra note 153, at 495.
191 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973).
192 SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 173, at 702.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 707.
195 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359,
§ 302, 108 Stat. 3423, 3444-46 (1994) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1822).
196 SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 173, at 708.
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ity. While the national-security exception has traditionally been
limited to the electronic-surveillance-through-wiretapping
sphere, this article examines the possibility of extending the na-
tional-security exception to examining executive power in the
airport-security context.
B. APPLYING THE NATIONAL-SECURITY EXCEPTION TO THE TSA
Examining the constitutionality of airport security searches
under the framework of the Executive's inherent power to pro-
tect the national security-the "national-security exception"-
may provide an approach that better protects both national-se-
curity interests as well as constitutional privacy rights of air trav-
elers. The administrative-search doctrine, as discussed above, is
ill-suited to a world with the TSA.'9 7 Most courts pay lip service
to the idea of balancing, but then, due to the national-security
interest inherent in airport security-namely, preventing air-
plane terrorism-place a thumb on the scale in favor of the gov-
ernment."' The danger of such an approach is that it may not
adequately protect the vital interests of individuals under the
Fourth Amendment. Because courts already treat airport secur-
ity checkpoints differently' 99 than other administrative
searches-namely, with fewer Fourth Amendment restrictions-
the courts should explicitly recognize that fact. Applying the na-
tional-security exception would allow courts to move away from
the confusing and inconsistent airport-security-checkpoint-spe-
cial-administrative-search doctrine to a judicial framework that
protects individual travelers as well as the nation as a whole.2 0 0
At the same time, courts could finally avoid the difficult-if not
impossible-task of squaring the TSA's new search regime with
case law decided under pre-2001 screening procedures.2 0 '
197 See supra Part II.C.4.
198 One example is the lack of analysis of the security benefits of body scanners
by the D.C. Circuit in Electronic Privacy Information Center v. U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 653 F.3d 1, 10-11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). See Israelsen, supra note
134.
199 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
200 It would also protect the administrative-search exception for use in non-
airport security contexts.
201 See Reinert, supra note 7 (arguing that the TSA's new search regime is much
more difficult to square with fundamental Fourth Amendment principles than
the FAA's initial airport screening procedures).
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1. Does the Exception Apply?
Historically, courts have applied the national-security excep-
tion only to electronic surveillance-warrantless wiretapping. 20 2
Even then, courts have applied the exception narrowly. For ex-
ample, the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Ehrlichman declined to
apply the exception to a case in which government agents broke
into a psychiatrist's office to gather evidence.20o The court held
that no national-security exception to the warrant requirement
could be invoked without specific authorization by the President
or Attorney General.2 0 ' Furthermore, the concurrence argued
that even if the Supreme Court were to allow the national-secur-
ity exception to justify warrantless surveillance, it would only be
when "practical realities require a . .. surveillance . . . that does
not lend itself to the warrant procedure."205 Scholars have also
explored the question whether the national-security exception
to the warrant requirement may be limited to only electronic
surveillance cases.206
Those questions may not matter in the context of airport se-
curity. It is unquestionably settled that warrantless airport secur-
ity searches are permissible,2 07 precisely because the practical
realities of airport security require the ability to search every pas-
senger, regardless of whether any individualized suspicion ex-
ists. To impose a warrant requirement at the airport would be
impracticable".2 0 Thus, the question whether the national-secur-
202 See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that the government must
obtain a warrant before installing a wiretap on a domestic organization that is not
an agent of or collaborating with a foreign power, even if the wiretap is used to
gather foreign intelligence to protect national security).
203 United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
204 Id. at 925.
205 Id. at 938 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
206 See William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security
Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 67-68 (2000) ("In light of the potentially greater
intrusiveness of electronic surveillance, it may be reasonable to expect greater
executive discretion to conduct warrantless searches than warrantless wiretaps.");
Andrew Puzder, The Fourth Amendment and Executive Authorization of Warrantless
Foreign Security Surveillance, 1978 WASH. U. L. Q. 397 (1978) (examining efforts to
legislatively limit executive discretion in this area); David S. Eggert, Note, Execu-
tive Order 12,333: An Assessment of the Validity of Warrantless National Security
Searches, 1983 DuKE L.J. 611, 627-28 (1983) (arguing that a general national-
security exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement would be
unconstitutional).
207 See Rogers, supra note 2, at 519.
208 See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829
(2002) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
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ity exception could be used to escape the warrant requirement
is unnecessary. Because there is no question that airport security
agents do not need to obtain pre-seizure judicial approval, the
question is simply what the scope of the national-security excep-
tion would be if it were applied in airport security cases.
2. Courts Already Treat Airport Security Differently
It is helpful to note that in airport security cases, courts al-
ready apply a standard apart from the typical administrative-
search doctrine.209 For example, in a typical Fourth Amendment
case, after finding a violation, a court will not allow any further
action on the part of the government.2 10 By contrast, when con-
sidering the legality of the TSA using AIT scanners for screening
airport passengers in Electronic Privacy Information Center, the
D.C. Circuit held that the TSA unjustifiably "fail[ed] to initiate
notice-and-comment rulemaking before announcing it would
use AIT scanners for primary screening. "211 But citing "the obvi-
ous need for the TSA to continue its airport security operations
without interruption," the court decided to simply "remand the
rule to the TSA" rather than vacate it.2 12 WAhile the court consid-
ered and rejected the Fourth Amendment claims-using a cur-
209 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
210 See, e.g., id. at 44, 48 (narcotics checkpoint program found in violation of
Fourth Amendment was terminated).
211 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
212 Id. Note that after a year passed without the TSA responding to the D.C.
Circuit's order to the TSA to initiate notice-and-comment proceedings on its use
of AIT scanners for primary screening, the Electronic Information Privacy Center
filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus asking the court to enforce its own order.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Enforce this Court's Mandate at i, In re Elec.
Privacy Info. Cr., No. 12-1307 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 17, 2012). The petition was "denied
in light of the Government's representation that 'the process of finalizing the
AIT Rulemaking documents so that the NPRM may be published is expected to
be complete by or before the end of February 2013."' Order, In re Elec. Privacy
Info. Ctr., No. 12-1307 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 2012) (quoting Declaration ofJohn P.
Sammon at 9, In re Elec. Privacy Info. Cr., No. 12-1307). The TSA finally initiated
notice-and-comment proceedings on AIT scanners in mid-2013, over two years
after the D.C. Circuit mandated the proceedings. See Susan Stellin, Trying Passen-
ger Patience, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/
business/public-pours-scorn-on-airport-body-scanners.html?_r=o. Additionally,
the TSA recently announced that it would be removing all backscatter scanners
from airports and that, afterJune 1, 2013, all airport scanners would display po-
tentially hazardous items on a generic passenger image rather than on images of
actual individual passengers. See Nicas, supra note 138.
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sory administrative-search analysis 213-the point here is that the
court treated the TSA differently on the basis of its "essential
security operation. "214
The D.C. Circuit erred for several reasons, not the least of
which being that it simply failed to balance the competing inter-
ests of the case. The court did not look closely at the privacy
concerns asserted by the passengers; it instead merely accepted
the TSA's claim that it was seeking to protect passenger pri-
vacy.2 15 Independent of the TSA's claim about passenger privacy
lie the actual experiences of individual passengers-if an indi-
vidual feels violated, an agency's claim that the person should
not feel that way means little. The fact that the lawsuit was
brought ought to have provided at least a minimum level of evi-
dence that a real privacy concern did in fact exist.
The D.C. Circuit also failed to address any evidence that AIT
screeners actually improve passenger security. 21 6 Instead, it
merely accepted at face value-with no supporting evidence-
the assertion that "an AIT scanner, unlike a magnetometer, is
capable of detecting, and therefore of deterring, attempts to
carry aboard airplanes explosives in liquid or powder form."2 17
But this claim lies in sharp contrast to the facts about AIT scan-
ners. "The scanners cannot detect [the plastic explosive] PETN
directly; instead they look for suspicious bulges under clothing.
Because PETN is a Silly Putty-like material, it can be fashioned
into a thin pancake. Taped flat to the stomach, the pancake is
invisible to scanning machines." 2 18 Another option terrorists
could use to defeat the scanners would be to "stick gum-size
wads of the explosive in their mouths, then go through security
enough times to accumulate the desired amount."2 1 9
213 The D.C. Circuit. spent little over a printed page-fewer than 640 words
spanning four paragraphs-on its entire analysis of the Fourth Amendment is-
sues in the case. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10-11.
214 Id. at 8.
215 See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
216 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10-11.
217 Id. at 10.
218 Charles C. Mann, Smoke Screening, VANily FAIR (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.
vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/12/tsa-insanity-201112. Mann's article was
based on a trip to the airport with security expert Bruce Schneier. Id. It is unclear
whether the arguments noted above were raised in the Electronic Privacy Informa-
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Neither the existence of privacy concerns of air travelers nor
of security imperfections of AIT scanners is dispositive. The
problem in Electronic Privacy Information Center was that the D.C.
Circuit failed to perform the requisite balancing.2 Instead, the
court simply pointed to Edmond 2 1-" [t] he need to search air-
line passengers 'to ensure public safety can be particularly
acute'"-as the reason for finding that "the balance clearly fa-
vors the Government." 2 2 2 Such a cavalier approach to "balanc-
ing" cannot be what the Court had in mind when it described
the "sacred nature" of the Fourth Amendment.223
Because modern courts have proven unable or unwilling to
perform a true administrative-search balancing for airport secur-
ity in the wake of 9/11, a new framework for analyzing the issue
is needed. The national-security exception, based on the Execu-
tive's constitutional obligation to protect the nation's security,
provides that necessary framework.
3. The Scope of the National-Security Exception as Applied to the
TSA
The scope of the national-security exception-as applied to
airport security-is unclear because it is undefined. Congress
expanded FISA to cover physical searches, but not those of the
kind implicated in airport security.224
The Keith case acknowledged that there is no "question or
doubt as to the necessity of obtaining a warrant in the surveil-
lance of crimes unrelated to the national security interest."2 25
But the Court went on to state that "[i]mplicit in [the Presi-
dent's] duty [to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution]
is the power to protect our [g]overnment against those who
would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means. "226
Yet in recognizing the difficulty of the question, the Court ex-
plained, "Given the difficulty of defining the domestic security
interest, the danger of abuse in acting to protect that interest
220 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10-11.
221 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
222 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47-48).
223 See cases cited supra note 106 and accompanying text.
224 See SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 173.
225 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972) (citing
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967)).
226 Id. at 310.
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becomes apparent."2 2 7 One reason that applying-the national-
security exception would be preferable to the administrative-
search exception is that courts would likely be more vigilant
against "mission creep."1" Using the national-security exception
reminds a court that the true question is whether the national-
security interest in the given fact-specific case outweighs the im-
portant Fourth Amendment protections being violated. By ex-
amining airport security questions in such a context, courts can
be explicit in acknowledging that they are putting a "thumb on
the scale" to allow the TSA to prevent terrorism in aviation.
At the same time, by acknowledging the weight given to the
government's interest in security, a court will undoubtedly be
more conscious of the need to ensure that the individual's pri-
vacy interests are not being put on the altar for naught. An indi-
vidual whose privacy is violated can sue for relief, thereby
allowing courts to further define the contours of the exception.
One way that a court could perform a proper analysis under
the airport national-security exception would be to consider ac-
tual security improvements. If a new technology is being ques-
tioned, then the actual improvement in the battle against
terrorism can be measured and considered. If a new search tech-
nique or procedure is before the court, again, the actual security
improvement can be evaluated. If the government cannot show
an improvement in security, if the improvement is merely margi-
nal, or even if the improvement is questionable, the court can
then determine whether the national-security interest is really
being advanced by the change.
Actual security improvements can be weighed against the cor-
responding increased intrusion on the individual's privacy. The
degree of intrusion would be dictated by the facts of the case,
but the more a security measure intrudes on an individual's pri-
vacy, the more the government should be required to show that
the security measure actually increases security. Conversely, the
less a security measure intrudes on privacy, the less scrutiny that
measure must undergo. Even measures formerly forbidden 2 2 9 by
227 Id. at 314.
228 One example of mission creep may include TSA officers "fish[ing] for evi-
dence of criminal conduct far removed from the agency's mandate of ensuring
flight safety." Scott McCartney, Is Tougher Airport Screening Going Too Far?, WALL
ST.J. (July 16, 2009, 1:44 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970
204556804574261940842372518.html.
229 This is theoretical, since no court has ever struck down an airport security
measure for failing the administrative-search balancing test.
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the courts may now be acceptable, whether because privacy stan-
dards have changed 230 or because technology has made the
measure more effective.2 3 1
Performing a balancing in full view of the fact that a warrant-
less search is being performed on millions of suspicionless pas-
sengers with the goal of improving national security would help
a court keep proper perspective. While both the administrative-
search exception and the national-security exception require
balancing, the weighting of the factors is different. Divorcing
the airport search analysis from non-analogous administrative
searches would further help protect the Fourth Amendment
rights of those being searched at airports nationwide. The con-
comitant restrictions imposed on administrative searches in
other contexts have mostly been severed from application to air-
ports; completely cutting the cord prevents courts from taking
the additional leeway granted in those same cases. 3
Applying the national-security exception to airport security
would be a step in the right direction. It would help the courts
avoid the difficult task of fitting modern search techniques into
the ill-suited administrative-search exception. The national-se-
curity exception would help courts remember the reason for al-
lowing the search in the first place. Therefore, Fourth
Amendment concerns would be weighed seriously, resulting
more often in outcomes that could protect the individual as well
as the country.
230 SeeJack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw.
U. L. REv. 549, 584 (2009) ("The distribution of public opinion and professional
notions of reasonableness, however, do not remain constant.").
231 For example, a pat-down twenty years ago might have only uncovered a
handgun concealed on a passenger's body, whereas today, when combined with
Explosives Trace Detection technology, a pat-down could expose an otherwise
undiscovered security risk, such as nonmetal explosives. See Security Technologies,
TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/security-technologies (last modified July 23,
2013).
232 This is a key point-in many administrative-search cases, courts find partic-
ularly intrusive Fourth Amendment searches reasonable "only because" they are
limited by some factor. But when those courts specifically exempt airports from
application, that does not mean that the same search would be acceptable at an
airport; it simply means that the court declined to extend its holding to cover
such a search. Furthermore, many administrative-search airport security cases
were decided before the creation of the TSA and the advent of its security mea-
sures. Those earlier cases are frequently not analogous to modern fact patterns.
Moving away from the administrative-search exception would help courts remem-




Regardless of which approach courts apply going forward,
they ought to make some changes. One option is to begin per-
forming a true balancing when examining TSA search proce-
dures using the administrative-search exception. But a better
approach is to acknowledge that the administrative-search doc-
trine does not apply to airport security and instead analyze the
Fourth Amendment issues using the national-security exception.
The national-security exception presents the best option be-
cause it reminds courts that the government's interest is na-
tional security, and that the government is being allowed special
privileges because of the importance of that interest. And at the
same time, because those special privileges are allowed, courts
will also be careful to limit government action to what is actually
effective in fulfilling those interests. In addition, individuals' pri-
vacy interests counterbalance the scope of those special privi-
leges. As in other national-security exception cases-i.e.,
warrantless wiretapping-the close, skeptical scrutiny of the
courts can only help to protect the privacy interests of the
individual.
Congress can help with this issue as well. Congress has been
supported by the Supreme Court in its efforts to reign in war-
rantless executive searches, even when those searches have been
performed under the guise of national security.
In the case of national security, it is in the interests of all
Americans, and particularly the elected members of Congress,
to maximize scarce resources. The nation has spent over $1.1
trillion on homeland security since 9/11.233 AIT scanners alone
cost $1.2 billion per year."' But according to security experts,
"[t] he only useful airport security measures since 9/11 ... were
locking and reinforcing the cockpit doors[ ] so terrorists can't
break in, positive baggage matching[,] ... and teaching the pas-
sengers to fight back. The rest is security theater."2 3 5 As such,
Congress should update the laws regulating the TSA to strike a
reasonable balance between national security and every citizen's
interest in freedom from government intrusion.
Such a change in the courts and Congress would be a step in
the right direction in America's quest for not only safer but also
friendlier skies.
233 Mann, supra note 218.
234 Id.
235 Id. (quoting Bruce Schneier).
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